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Assignments by the Landowner and the Lessee'
By ROBERT E. SULLIVAN*
INTRODUCTION
Whereas the basic principles of oil and gas law have been defined and
quite well established ou the subjects of the nature of oil and gas in place,
lease clauses and their operative effect, and the constitutionality of con-
servation statutes and regulations, the field of assignments has been a proli-
fic source of litigation. This is due chiefly to two things: First the lack of
preciseness in the drafting of mineral deeds and royalty assignments and
secondly a misuse of printed forms. This is attributable in great measure
to a failure to distinguish between the various interests of a landowner and
a lessee that may be separately assigned. The result has been that the par-
ties or their successors go to the courts for a judicial construction of the
instruments and the courts are called upon to ascertain the intent of the
parties and the operative effect of their agreement when the parties them-
selves can neither agree nor apparently ascertain what that intent was.
Inasmuch as this is such a broad subject and because there are so many
seemingly irreconcilable cases, it may be well to outline the scope of this
paper. In other words, we should visualize the mosaic and then proceed to
construct it by dissecting the individual parts and reassembling them.
To this end, we will first discuss the various types of interests that may
be assigned. Following this we will consider some of these interests in-
dividually by discussing permissible assignments by a landowner. Then we
will examine permissible assignments by a lessee. Following this there will
be certain miscellaneous items such as the obligations of a lessee on express
and implied covenants in a lease after he has assigned his interest, and a
brief reference to the application of securities regulations of the federal and
state governments to the assignment of fractional interests.
A. TYPES OF PERMISSIBLE ASSIGNMENTS
The Nature of Assignable Interests
The owner of the fee simple, or the absolute owner of a tract of land,
has all of the rights recognized by the law in both the surface and the min-
erals. In disposing of his ownership he can transfer all of his rights in the
entire premises or in a part thereof.' From his ownership he can carve out
subordinate interests." This results in a transfer of a part of his rights but
leaves in him a residue of interest that is also subject to subsequent transfer.!
*Dean, Law School, Montana State University.
tPortions of this paper have been reproduced from RoBzaT E. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOx
op OL AND GAS LAW (copyright, 1955, by Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York), by per-
mission of the publisher.
'Thus, if A owns Section 16, Township 4 North, Range 6 West, he can sell all of
Section 16 or any part thereof, such as the NWIA.
2Thus A, ii the example given In footnote 1 supra, can lease the NWY4 to party B
for agricultural purposes.
$Where A as the owner of Section 16 leases the NW'4 to party B, A Is not entitled
to possession for the term of the lease, but his right to receive rent and his rever-
sionary Interest in the leased premises are both transferable to B or to any other
person.
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Thus, a landowner can sell, i.e., make an outright disposition of, his en-
tire interest in a specified tract.' He can sell the surface and retain the
minerals or vice versa, in which event there is a severance of his interest into
a surface estate and a mineral estate or at least a severance of the surface
from those rights in the oil and gas which are recognized in that particular
jurisdiction.5 He can sell all,' a segregated part,' or an undivided interest8
in the minerals. He can sell all, or a part, of his interest in the proceeds
from the minerals, as distinguished from a sale of the minerals themselves.'
The oil and gas lease is the outstanding example of a landowner carving
out subordinate interests from his ownership and transferring them to an-
other.' The interests transferred are subordinate in the sense that they are
not the equivalent of the landowner 's rights, and they may terminate and
go back to the landowner if the terms of the lease are not complied with.'
'"When the owner of the entire estate in land conveys it by ordinary form of deed
containing no exception or reservation, his grantee acquires the same title which
his grantor had, and such title includes all minerals." Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex.
93, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304 (1943).
"'The owner of the entire estate in land may convey the minerals therein separately
from the surface. Conversely, he may convey the surface separately from the min-
erals. Stated in another way: The owner has the right to sever his land into two
estates, and he may dispose of the mineral estate and retain the surface or he may
dispose of the surface estate and retain the minerals.... A severance of the mineral
estate from the remainder of the land may be effected either by the conveyance of
the minerals alone or by the conveyance of the land with a reservation of the min-
erals .... When the mineral estate In land has been severed from the balance of
the land there come into existence two separate and distinct estates, each having
all the incidents and attributes of an estate in land .... The mere grant or reserva-
tion of minerals in place does not vest the grantee or reserver with any title to the
surface. In spite of this, the grant or reservation of minerals carries with It, as a
necessary appurtenance thereto, the right to use so much of the surface as may be
necessary to enforce and enjoy the mineral estate conveyed or reserved. This Is
because a grant or reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the grantee
or reserver could not enter upon the land In order to explore for and extract the
minerals granted or reserved." Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304(1943). And see Tomlinson v. Thumon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938).
'Thus, if A owns Section 16, Township 4 North, Range 6 West, he can "grant, bar-
gain, sell, convey, transfer, assign, and deliver unto B. all of my right title and Inter-
est In and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may be
produced from Section 16, Township 4 North, Range 6 West," etc.
'In the example In footnote 6, supra, the minerals conveyed would be "in and under
and that may be produced from the NW'!4 of Section 16, Township 5 North, Range
6 West, etc."
'In the example In footnote 6, supra, the granting clause would provide: "grant,
bargain, sell, convey, transfer, assign, and deliver unto B, an undivided M interest
In and to all of the oils," etc.
'A grant of the minerals would Include as an Incident, all of the proceeds therefrom,
such as the bonus payment, the delay rentals, and the royalties which go to the
landowner who executes an oil and gas lease. However, the proceeds, i.e., the bonus,
the delay rentals, and the royalties, can be conveyed separately from a conveyance
of the minerals. Thus, a conveyance of a fractional mineral Interest In advance of
the execution of an oil and gas lease would entitle the purchaser thereof to share
in the bonus, delay rental and royalty payable thereunder.
But a conveyance of a fractional royalty Interest In advance of the execution of an
oil and aq lease would not entitle the purchaser to share in the bonus or the delay
rental but only In the royalty If production was obtained. This Is so because a
royalty Interest Is merely an Interest In the proceeds from the mineral-the amount
nayable bec.quse of a contract or a conveyance In the event of production-and not
nn interest In the minerals themselves.
'0Other examples would be a royalty conveyance limited In duration to the term of
an existing leas e or term mineral deeds or term royalty deeds.
"The are not subordinate In the sense that the lessee Is entitled to TA of the gross
production. In some iurlsdictions the execution of a lease Is regarded as the convey-
ance of an undivided T Interest In the oil and gas In place, subject to being termi-
nated however, in the event no production Is obtained.
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As consideration for the execution of the lease and under the provisions
thereof, the landowner retains certain rights: (1) To receive the bonus
money paid for the execution of the lease; (2) to receive delay rentals under
th terms of the lease; (3) to receive royalties under the terms of the lease;
(4) the possibility of reverter in the minerals in the event there is no produc-
tion during the primary term or in the event production in paying quanti-
ties ceases during the indefinite term; and (5) to use the surface so long as
he does not interfere with the operations of the lessee thereon.
Each of these rights under an oil and gas lease is a separate and dis-
tinct interest in real property, which can be conveyed separately." Dif-
ferent fractional parts of these various interests can be transferred in the
same instrument." If the landowner desires, his entire remaining interest
may be transferred, in which event the rights of the purchaser are subject
to those of the lessee so long as the lease continues.
There are also a number of permissible assignments which may be ef-
fected by an oil and gas lessee. He can transfer his entire interest under
the lease; he can transfer his entire interest and reserve an undivided inter-
est or a fractional interest payable only out of production; or he can grant
fractional or undivided interests from his ?/8 working interest. A few juris-
dictions, such as Montana, construe some of these transfers as sub-leases
rather than assignments.
B. ASSIGNMENTS BY A LANDOWNER
Mineral Deeds
A mineral deed is an instrument which transfers the minerals as they
exist in place, or the right to obtain them. In form, it is similar to a gen-
eral warranty deed, and was adapted from the forms of conveyance used to
transfer ownership of solid minerals. The rights acquired in oil and gas
under such an instrument are as follows:
1. The right to go upon the land, conduct exploratory operations, and
produce oil and gas. If there is a subsisting oil and gas lease, this right is
subject thereto, but may be exercised if and when the lease terminates;
2. The right to execute an oil and gas lease. If there is a subsisting
lease, this right is also subject thereto;
3. The right to a share in the bonus under future leases;
4. The right to a share in the rentals under existing and future leases;
5. The right to share in the royalties under existing and future leases.
""Having leased the realty for oil and gas purposes he was then vested with three
distinct and separate interests--(1) the fee simple title to the surface estate,(2) the reserved royalty interest, and (3) the possibility of a reverter of the min-
erals .... Each of these interests is an interest in real property, alienable and may
be conveyed separately and independently of the others." Brown v. Copp, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 232 P.2d 868, 871 (1951). And see La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18
Cal. 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351, 135 A.L.R. 546 (1941) ; Abney v. Lewis, 213 Miss. 105, 56
So. 2d 48 (1952) -reservation of rentals did not include royalties; Dale v. Case,
217 Miss. 298, 64 So. 2d 344 (1953) -fractional part of rights under future leases,
not rights under present lease; Benge v. Scharbauer . ..... Tex ....... 259 S.W.2d 166
(1953).
"'"It seems to us that many seemingly irreconcilable conflicts could be resolved with-
out resort to oral evidence if the courts and practitioners would recognize that in
the same instrument competent parties may grant a fractional interest In the min-
erals rights, another and different fractional interest In the royalties and another
and different fractional interest in the bonuses and rentals, as the Supreme Court
did in the Hinkle case [Hinkle v. Gauntt, 201 Okla. 432, 206 P.2d 1001 (1949) 1."
Mason, Mi'neral Rights or Royalties, _2 OKLA. B.A.J. 621 (1951).
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Inasmuch as these rights may be transferred separately, it is difficult
in many instances to distinguish a true mineral deed from other types of oil
and gas conveyances. The name given to the instrument does not control."
The extent of the rights conveyed serves as an index of the intent of the
parties and of the purpose for which the instrument was executed.
Thus in the Texas case of Danciger Oil and Refining Co. v. Powel,' an
oil and gas lease was distinguished as follows:
... a lease is usually for only a limited time, with provision for
termination thereafter upon cessation of production; whereas, a
conveyance is unlimited as to time. But the most essential differ-
ence is the fact that the predominating purpose of a lease is to se-
cure the exploitation and development of the property for the pur-
pose set out in the lease.
Fractional Mineral Deeds
In the construction of mineral deeds the entire instrument is to be con-
sidered,' but difficulties arise where only part of the elements of a mineral
interest are conveyed or reserved. This is especially true where such frac-
tional interests are not clearly defined and where the conveyance is made
subject to an existing lease. Where the mineral deed is made subject to an
existing lease, it has been held that there is a grant of an undivided interest
(/2) in the minerals as specified in the granting clause of the mineral deed,
and a lesser undivided interest (1/16) in the royalties payable under the
existing lease." In other words, the recital of the existence of a lease has
the effect of modifying the granting clause of the deed. However, a con-
trary result has been reached in. other jurisdictionsm and the decision has
been criticized on the theory that a consideration of the entire instrument
indicates that the parties intended that the transfer of the fractional mineral
interest and the interest in the royalties be the same.
In the Montana case of Krutzfeld v. Stevenson" the grantor conveyed:
* five per cent interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other min-
erals in and under and that may be produced from the following
'"Rutland Saving Bank v. Steel, 155 Kan. 667, 127 P.2d 471 (1942) ; Midstates Oil
Corp. v. Keener, ...... Okla ........ 266 P.2d 467 (1953) -instrument labeled "royalty
deed" held to be a conveyance of mineral rights; Texas Gulf Prod. Co. v. Griffith,
218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 834 (1953)-provisions of the instrument must be con-
sidered to ascertain the nature of the interest transferred.
'5134 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1941).
'
6Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951).
'Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'"When there is an existing oil lease at the time the lessor executes a mineral deed,
it is not uncommon for the deed to grant not only a given fraction of all the oil In,
under, and that may be produced from the land, but also the same fractional inter-
est in the royalties payable under the lease. . . . If the first clause of such a deed
were construed as creating an expense-free royalty interset, it would grant the
stated fraction of the total production rather than the stated fraction of the land-
owner's royalty reserved under the lease, and therefore would be inconsistent with
the second clause. It has been held, however, that such deeds are not internally
inconsistent and that the grant of the stated fraction of the royalties under the
existing lease is merely a statement of the legal effect of granting the same frac-
tion of all the oil in, under, and that may be produced from the land." Little v.
Mountain View Dairies, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416, 418 (1950) ; and see
Brokerick v. Stevenson Consolidated Oil Co., 88 Mont. 34, 290 Pac. 244 (1930).
1
"Williams, Hoffmnn v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: The 'Subject-To' Clau8e in Mineral
and Royalty Deeds, 30 TnxAs L. Ruv. 395 (1952).
'86 Mont. 463, 284 Pac. 553 (1930).
4
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described lands, . . . together with the right of ingress and egress
... for the purpose of mining.., and removing the same therefrom.
And said lands being now under... lease (providing for 1/8 royal-
ty) . . . it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject
to said lease, but covers and includes two-fifths of all the oil royalty
and gas rental or royalty due or to be paid under the terms of said
lease.
It is agreed and understood that two-fifths of the money rentals
which may be paid to extend the term of said lease is to be paid to
the said L. C. Stevenson; Trustee.
The instrument went on to recite that if the existing lease became can-
celled or forfeited then the lease interests and all future rentals for oil,
gas and mineral privileges should be owned jointly by Krutzfeld and
Stevenson in the ratio of 3/5ths and 2/5ths respectively. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court construed the instrument as an entirety and concluded
that its effect was to transfer a 2/5ths interest in the rents and royalties
under the existing lease and a 2/5ths interest in the grantor's reversion in
the minerals. Professor Summers' interprets this as a grant of a 2/5ths of
the mineral fee made subject to an existing lease and a grant of 2/5ths of
the rents and royalties under the existing lease rather than the grant of a
royalty expanding into a mineral fee as it has been referred to by some
others.
Mr. Walker states' that in these cases the grantor intends to convey two
different groups of property interests, namely the designated fraction of
the grantor's reversionary interest or possibility of reverter in the minerals
and secondly tbe rentals and royalties payable under the terms of the exist-
ing lease. Because of the practice of making mineral deeds subject to exist-
ing leases as a protection to the grantor on his general covenant of warranty,
the grant of these additional privileges under the existing oil and gas lease
is necessary to avoid the construction that the grantor intended to convey
only a present mineral fee, and rents and royalties under future leases. For
this reason, Mr. Walker recommends that where typical printed forms of
mineral deeds are utilized, the same fraction should be inserted in the grant-
ing clause providing for a conveyance of minerals, the royalty and rental
transfer clause, and in the terminal clause wherein it is provided that if the
existing lease terminates the grantee shall own a certain fractional share of
the minerals.
It has been held that a full mineral interest, or a fractional part there-
of, may be conveyed, and that a conveyance of different fractional amounts
of the diverse elements of a full mineral interest may be made in the same
instrument. Thus:
A grantor may reserve unto himself mineral rights, and he may
also reserve royalties, bonuses and rentals-either one, more, or
all.... An instrument may convey two separate estates in the min-
erals, one of which may be a full mineral interest and the other
a royalty, or other interest in the minerals."
2'10 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 16 (1931).
nWALKER, CASES ON OIL AND GAS, 733-36 (1949).
'WALKER, CASES ON OIL AND GAS, 734-45 (1949).
uBenge v. Scharbauer, . Tex ........ 259 S.W.2d 166, 168 (1953) ; Hinkle v. Gauntt,
201 Okla. 432, 206 P.2d 1001 (1949)-"except a 1/16 interest in the oil and gas de-
posits that may be developed on said land, and also an undivided % interest in the
5
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Inasmuch as the term "royalty" is frequently used when the parties
intend to convey a mineral interest, it is imperative to distinguish the two
interests if clarity of thought and precision of statement are to be achieved.
Thus, where a conveyance of a 1/32 interest is made, the grantee would get
1/32 of the production as a free royalty if in fact a royalty interest had
been conveyed. However, if it were a conveyance of the mineral interest
he would get 1/32 of the production less that fraction of the cost of produc-
tion, or he would join in a lease and get that fraction of the 1/8 royalty re-
served in the lease, that is, 1/256.' In the former case, an expense-free
royalty interest has been transferred; in the latter case, an expense-bearing
mineral fee interest has been conveyed."
Fractional Conveyances by Owners of Fractional Interests
The greatest difficulty in interpretation arises in those cases where the
owner of an undivided interest undertakes to convey or reserve a fractional
interest that is smaller than that which he owns. The validity of such con-
veyances is recognized,' but in most instances, it is difficult to ascertain
whether the conveyance is of a fraction of the undivided fractional interest
of the grantor or of a fraction of the entire premises in which the grantor
has merely an undivided fractional interest. Thus, in a Texas case where
the owner of an undivided 5/8 interest conveyed an undivided 1/4 interest
in all the oil and gas under the premises, it was held that the deed evidenced
an intent to convey an undivided 1/4 interest in the minerals in the entire
tract.' And where the owner of an undivided 1/2 interest, by a deed
describing the whole tract, reserved an undivided 1/8 of the customary 1/8
royalty on all oil that may be produced from the land, it was held that he
was entitled to a full 1/8 of the royalty (1/64 in other words) and not
merely 1/2 of 1/8 of the royalty (or 1/128).'
bonus and rental of oil and gas lease now existing against said land, and the crop
rental for the year 1919." (Petition to reform deed to show reservation of inter-
est in the minerals denied.)
"'"The ownership of a given fractional interest in the minerals when a lease is exe-
cuted entitles the owner to the same fractional part of the royalty. A of the
minerals gives him of the royalty, and a 1/16 of the minerals 1/16 of the usual
% royalty, not of it. The ownership of 1/16 of the minerals before leasing does
entitle the owner to 1/16 of the entire production, but not free of cost, and the costs
after leasing are borne by the lessee in return for / of the said 1/16 of the produc-
tion. At a ratio of ' to %, is requires of the production to enable the lessee
to deliver 1/16 free of cost. And, it requires of the oil and gas in place to en-
able the owner to [receive] of the production before costs If he is to receive
1/16 clear, he must own in place." Langford. Arkan.sas Form. of Royalty Deed
for Oil and Gas Conveyances, 3 ARx. L. Rav. 190 (1949). And see Wilson v. Stearn,
202 Ark. 1197, 149 S.W.2d 571 (1941).
"Little v. Mountain View Dairies, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950). But see
Hardy v. Greathouse, 406 Ill. 365, 94 N.E.2d 134 (1950).
'See, for example, Dennett v. Meredith, 168 Kan. 58, 211 P.2d 117 (1949) ; Brown v.
Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953).
28Spell v. Haines, 139 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)-although the deed provid-
ed "above grant to apply to our undivided interest in the above described land," the
court held that this was merely a direction that the grant should be of a portion
of the undivided interest.
2'King v. First Nat. Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946).
In Hooks v. Neill, 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) where the owner of an un-
divided Interest conveyed his entire Interest reserving a 1/32 in the land con-
veyed, it was held that he had reserved 1/32 of only. And see Continental Oil
Co. v. Tate, 211 La. 852, 30 So. 2d 858 (1947) ; Fatherree v. McCormick, 199 Miss.
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Where the conveyance is by warranty deed and the interest reserved is
of the same fractional interest as that reserved by the predecessor in title of
the grantor, it has been held that the grantor intended, in the absence of a
showing to the contrary, merely to limit the operation of the general cov-
enant of warranty rather than to reserve a new and additional undivided
interest. '  However, even if the grantor did intend to reserve an interest,
he will be estopped to assert his title if the interest which the deed purports
to convey to the grantee would be reduced thereby.'
Description of Fractional Mineral Interests
In the matter of describing the fractional interest conveyed, considera-
tion should be given to whether a stipulated fraction should be used, for
example, an undivided 1/4 mineral interest in a 160-acre tract, or whether
the specified number of undivided acres out of the tract should be used, e.g.,
an undivided 40 acre interest in the minerals in a 160 acre tract. When the
conveyance is of a specified undivided fractional interest, the grant is made
with respect to each part of the described premises, and a failure of title to
a part of the land will decrease proportionately the interest acquired by the
grantee.' On the other hand, where the conveyance is of a specified number
of mineral acres, the grantee would be entitled to the full number of mineral
acres out of whatever the grantor owned.' If the grantor owned more than
the number of acres recited in the deed, of course, the use of a designated
fraction would effect a proportionate increase in the interest acquired by
the mineral grantee. From the standpoint of the lessee, the use of a desig-
nated fraction is preferable because the division of bonus, rental, and royalty
payments may be computed with certainty without the necessity of deter-
mining the total amount of acreage owned by the grantor.
Term Mineral Deeds
In addition to the unqualified grant or reservation of fractional mineral
interests, there is also widespread use of term mineral conveyances. These
248, 24 So. 2d 724 (1946) ; Perkins v. Kemp, 274 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
-joinder by owners of undivided one-half interests in conveyance of undivided one-
half interest in the minerals, held a conveyance by each of undivided one-quarter
interest only.
"Klein v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 126 Tex. 451), 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935) ; Rose
v. Cook, 207 Okla. 582, 250 P.2d 848 (1952) -instrument construed by four corners
disclosed intent to limit warranty and not to reserve mineral interest; Murphy v.
Athans,. ..... Okla ....... 265 P.2d 461 (1953)-parol evidence not admissable to show
intent to reserve mineral interest rather than limitation of covenant of warranty.
"Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878, 885 (1940)-
owner of undivided 3/ conveyed with reservation of one-half interest. "The grant-
ing clause of the deed . . .purports to convey to the grantee the land described,
that is, the surface estate and all of the mineral estate. The covenant warrants
the title to 'the said premises' . . . Thus the deed is so written that the general
warranty extends to the full fee simple title to the land except an undivided one-
half interest in the minerals.
"Daniel v. Allen, 129 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)-Interest of grantee in part
of tract actually owned by his grantor will not be increased to make up the loss.
Remedy is action for money damages for breach of warranty. And see Olvey v.
Jones, 95 SW.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Turner v. Hunt, 116 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938).
"Sims v. Woods, 267 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)--conveyance of 25/200 of
the minerals, "It being the intention of the Grantor herein to convey to Grantee a
full undivided 25 acre mineral interest," held conveyance of 25/200 interest only
even though tract subsequently was found to contain 226.88 acres.
7
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conveyances are either for a specified term of years or for a term and so long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the premises. Where the convey-
ance is for a specified term, the mineral interest terminates at the expira-
tion of the fixed period even though there is production in paying quanti-
ties."
Where the conveyance is for a specified term and so long thereafter as
oil and gas are produced, the interest terminates at the end of the fixed
period in the absence of production.'
Royalty as the Subject Matter of Assignment
Royalty is a share in production. As applied to an oil and gas lease,
it means the share of the oil which is received by the lessor from production
under the lease' in return for permission to use the property by withdraw-
ing the oil therefrom." In its broadest sense, however, it refers to an inter-
est that the landowner may create by outright grant or reservation either
before or after the execution of an oil and gas lease.' When used in this
sense, the ownership of royalty gives no right to enter upon the land for any
purpose or to interfere with the landowner in any way.' Moreover, it gives
no right or interest in the minerals in place, the right to royalty being con-
tingent upon production.' It has been referred to as "nonparticipating
royalty" to distinguish it from a grant of the rights that are incident to the
transfer of a full mineral interest.'1 That is, it is an interest that bears no
part of the cost of production and which does not entitle the owner thereof
to participate in the execution of a lease on the premises nor share in the
bonus or delay rental payments thereunder. In Schlittler v. Smith, the
Texas Court of Appeals observed that:
royalty rights . . . does not include a reservation of bonuses or
rentals, but only of an interest in oil, gas, or minerals paid, re-
ceived, or realized as 'royalty' under any lease existing on the land
at the time of the reservation, or thereafter xecuted by the grantee,
his heirs or assigns.'
0 Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)-twenty years; Pep-
pers Ref. Co. v. Barkett, 208 Okla. 367, 256 P.2d 443 (1953)-twenty-five years.
'Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co.. 204 Okla. G91, 233 P.2d 959 (1951) ; Wilson v.
Holm, 164 Kan. 229, 188 P.2d 899 (1948)-rules construing "thereafter" provision
of habendum clause in oil and gas leases are applicable to "thereafter" provisions
in mineral deed; Owens v. Day, 207 Okla. 341, 249 P.2d 710 (1952) ; but in Beatty
v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953)-the strict rules of construction ap-
plicable to the habendum clause in leases was held inapplicable because reason for
rule not present.
'Davis v. Hurst, 150 Kan. 130, 90 P.2d 1100, 122 A.L.R. 957 (1939).
t Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 68 P.2d 773 (1937).
38Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179. 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945) ; Palmer v. Crews, 203
Miss. 806, 35 So. 2d 430, 4 A.L.R. 2(1 483 (1948).
'Moore v. City of Beaumont, 195 S.W.2d 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), aff'd, 146 Tex.
46, 202 S.W.2d 448 (1947).
'Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952).
'Jones, Nov-Participating, Royalty, 26 TEXAS L. Riv. 569 (1948) ; Hanson v. Ware,
...... Ark ....... 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955).
"101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), emphasis supplied, judgment reformed
in 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937) to allolw recovery of one-half of royalty re-
served under future leases: in Skelly Oil v. Cities Service Oil Co., 160 Kan. 226,
160 P.2d 246 (1945), royalty was interpreted to mean not oil in place but the share
in the oil and gas produced and paid as compensation for the right to drill and
produce, and not to include a perpetual interest in the oil an gas in the ground.
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A royalty interest, in the strict sense, is distinguished from a mineral
interest by the absence of any operating rights and the denial of participa-
tion in bonus and delay rental payments."
The Analogy of Common Law Rent
In its nature, royalty is comparable to common law rent." It is to be
distinguished from delay rentals payable under an oil and gas lease which
are money payments for the purpose of deferring drilling operations.' Com-
mon law rent is generally defined as the profit, either in money, provisions,
or labor, issuing out of lands and tenements, in return for their use."
Royalty as Real or Personal Property
Inasmuch as the term has been used in various senses, royalty has been
declared to be both real and personal property." The interest in accrued
royalties, that is, in the oil and gas that have been produced, is personal
""The essential difference between a sale of a royalty interest and a sale of a min-
eral interest in lands is that thd purchaser of the royalty interest has not right or
interest in the minerals in place or in the land, and receives nothing unless produc-
tion is obtained. Whereas, under a sale of a mineral interest the purchaser is en-
titled to lease his mineral interest and receive the bonus and rentals therefor and
thereunder and is entitled to enter upon the lalnd himself and develop and produce
the oil and gas therefrom." Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757, 758
(1952).
""It may be owned, held, enjoyed and assigned by the owner of the land. It Is not
merged in his title to the land. It is not an estate in the land. It is an incorporeal
hereditament whose owner has an estate in it besides and collateral to an estate
in his land, whether it is rent or not. If not rent, it is more like rent than any-
thing else conceivable or known to the law and is generally treated as rent, where-
fore the principle of analogy requires rights respecting it to be tested by the rules
and principles governing rents." Musgrave v. Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S.E. 302,
312, 16 A.L.R. 564, 580 (1920). J. Poffenbarger, dissenting.
In La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge. IS Cal. 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941), it was
held that royalties were a distinct species of property, that the analogy to rent ap-
plies to lessor's and overriding royalties but not to lessee's or landowner's royalties.
But see O'Neal v. Union Producing Co., 153 F.2d 157 (C.C.A. La. 1946), cert. den.,
329 U.S. 715-payment of royalty Is payment of rent; Ohio Oil Co. v. Wright, 386
111. 206. 53 N.E.2d 966 (1944).
"Carroll v. Bowen, note 37, supra.
"2 BouvrIn, LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's ed. 1914) 2880.
"'For the term royalty is used in three distinct senses: as an object of property
rights, as respecting quantum of the estate therein, and as the actual payment
made or to be made to the holder of a royalty interest. Within the meaning of the
suggested criterion, royalty, as an object of property rights, is real property. In
respect of duration, the royalty holder may enjoy a real property estate, as where
the extent of his interest is fee simple or fee qualified, or he may be vested with a
personal property estate, as where the extent of his interest is for a term of years.
The actual payment of accrued royalty is, of course, personal property. To further
emphasize the importance of qualifying the term royalty, it may be said that In
the objective sense royalty is always real property, that In the duration sense
royalty Is always personal property." Blake, Oil Royalties: A Suggested Criterion,
13 Mrss. L.J. 307, 322 (1941). And see Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So.2d 430,
4 A.L.R.2d 483 (1948).
As Real Property: Baker v. Vanderpool, 296 Ky. 663, 178 S.W.2d 189 (1944);
Duvall v. Stone, 54 N. Mex. 27. 213 P.2d 212 (1949) : Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290,
77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934). 80 S.W.2d 741 (1935) : and see Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex.
6219. 101 S.D.2d 543 (1937).
As Personal Property: Hickey v. Dirks, 156 Kan. 326, 133 P.2d 107 (1934)
Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951)-conveyance of royalty
under existing lease: Tegarden v. Beers, 175 Kan. 610, 265 P.2d 845 (1954)--agree-
ment to assign stipulated fraction of royalties "if and when oil and gas are pro-
duced from the land."
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property, but the interest in unaccrued royalty is an interest in land and
real property."
Royalty Deeds
The importance of establishing the analogy between royalties and rents
rests in the application of settled principles of law applicable to rents to the
problems created by royalty conveyances. Thus, just as unaccrued rent is
severable from the reversion, but will pass with a transfer of the reversion
without express mention, so also royalty may be created in perpetuity" or
for a term,' before' or after ' the execution of an oil and gas lease on the
premises, and will pass as an incident of the conveyance of the lessor's estate
unless specifically excepted therefrom."
Fractional royalty conveyances present much the same problem as frac-
tional mineral conveyances, and may be resolved on much the same basis.'
Thus, the word "of" in a conveyance providing for "1/16 of 1/8 of lessor's
usual royalty" has been construed as meaning "times" and not merely
descriptive of the nature of the interest transferred. '
A royalty conveyance may include an assignment of a percentage of
the delay rentals payable under existing or future leases without conveying
a mineral, as distinguished from a royalty, interest. ' In the same instru-
ment, a separate interest in the royalties and in the minerals may be con-
veyed. '
Extent of the Interest Created by Royalty Conveyances
The nature and extent of the interest acquired by the grantee depends
upon the intent of the grantor as expressed in the instrument of convey-
ance.5
The difficulty of ascertaining whether the grantor intended to convey
a royalty interest or a mineral fee interest is illustrated by the following
exception and reservation in a contract for the sale of a specified tract of
land:
... excepting and reserving unto the said first parties all except
two per cent (2%) of the landowner's royalty rights in and to all
"Mark v. Bradford, 315 Mich. 50, 23 N.W.2d 201 (1946) ; MeCully v. McCully, 184
Okla. 264, 86 P.2d 786 (1939).
"Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Nicholson, 207 Okla. 512, 251 P.2d 490 (1952).
"0Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
"Davis v. Hurst, 150 Kan. 130, 90 P.2d 1100, 122 A.L.R. 957 (1939).
'Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R. 871 (1935) ; and see De-
Muth, Conveyance of Royalty Rights Under ETi sting Leases, 24 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
250 (1952).
'White v. McVey, 168 Okla. 19, 31 P.2d 850, 94 A.L.R. 656 (1934) ; Local Federal
Sivings and Loan Assn. v. Eckroat, 186 Okla. 660, 100 P.2d 261 (1940).
"See Sullivan, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAs LAw § 113, Fractional Mineral Deeds,
(1955).
"Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945)-terms not ambiguous and
so 1/16 times 1/8 times 1/8 or 1/1024 was the Interest conveyed; King v. First
National Bank, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946)--owner of undivided 1/2 inter-
est in fee conveyed it to owner of other undivided 1/2 and reserved fractional
royalty interest "an undivided 1/8 of the usual and customary 1/8 royalty Inter-
est." Held reservation of 1/8 of entire 1/8 and not merely 1/8 of 1/2 of 1/8 of
royalty; Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41, 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943)-grant of frac-
tional, limited, non-participating royalty.
"Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 P. 140 (1926).
"Richardson v. Hart, note 55, supra.
"Krutzfeld v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 284 P. 553 (1930) ; Paddock v. Vasquez, 122
Cal. App. 2d 396, 265 P.2d 121 (1954).
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oil, gas and other minerals in, under or upon said premises, said
two per cent (2%) of said landowner's royalty rights to be deeded
to the said second party ...
If the term royalty has a well defined meaning and if in its nature it is
analogous to common law rent, then the instrument is not ambiguous. The
term landowner's royalty has been characterized as that interest which may
exist independently of any lease upon the property. It is distinguishable
from lessor's royalty which may be limited to the duration of an oil and gas
lease. This is a further example of how some order would be established out
of the chaos presently existing if the analogy to real property principles,
specifically that of common law rent, were adopted.
Fee and Term Royalty Deeds
Royalties, as well as minerals, may be conveyed in fee' or for a definite
term of years. Where the grant or reservation of the royalty interest is
made before the execution of an oil and gas lease on the premises and is not
otherwise limited as to time, the interest created is referred to as a perpetual
non-participating royalty.' If there is an existing lease on the property,
the conveyance should specify that the royalty interest conveyed thereby
is perpetual to avoid the contention that it conveys only the royalty under
the existing lease.'1 The grant or reservation of a "fee royalty of 1/32 of
the oil and gas" conveys that fraction of the entire production from the
tract conveyed' whereas the conveyance of 1/32 of royalty would transfer
only 1/32 of 1/8 or 1/256.
The conveyance of royalty for a term may take one of two forms; it
may be for a stipulated period, such as twenty years, or for a stipulated
period and as long thereafter as oil and gas are produced in paying quanti-
ties.' The interest may be created either before or after the execution of
an oil and gas lease on the premises. As in the case of mineral deeds, the
conveyance of an interest for a term only will terminate at the end of the
period even though there are producing wells on the premises as of that
date."' Where a "thereafter" clause is appended to the term grant, the
continuation of the interest is dependent upon the execution of a lease,
where none is in existence, and obtaining production prior to the end of
the term specified in the royalty deed and the continuation of such produc-
tion without interruption.'
'Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943).
ODenver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942) ; that is,
perpetual in the sense of duration; non-participating in the sense of no right to
participate in the making of future leases or share in the bonus and rental pay-
ments thereunder.
6tDabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. 2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935) ; First Na-
tional Bank v. Evans, 169 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
'Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
'For a form of thereafter clause used in connection with a term mineral grant see
Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937) ; see also Miller v. Speed,
259 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
'Peppers Refining Co. v. Barkett, 208 Okla. 367, 256 P.2d 443 (1953)-term mineral
deed.
'Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953-temporary cessation after
expiration of primary term of royalty grant will not terminate the interest where
the shut-down was for purposes of rehabilitating the well. Upshaw v. Norsworthy,
267 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)-recovery by swabbing, so long as It was in
paying quantities, constitutes "production of oil" within meaning of "thereafter
clause."
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C. ASSIGNMENTS BY THE LESSEE
A lessee may transfer his entire interest in the premises under lease,"
his entire interest in a part of the premises under lease,' or a fraction of his
rights in the premises, or a part thereof, under leasefor the whole or a part
of the remaining portion of the unexpired term of the lease." They may be
granted outright by the lessee or reserved in a conveyance of the leasehold.
Thus, a lessee may convey oil payments, overriding royalties, and undivided
interests,' or he may transfer his entire interest in a part of the leased
premises by a farm-out agreemnt"
Overriding Royalty
An overriding royalty is a certain percentage of the working interest
which, as between the lessee and the assignee, is not charged with the cost
of development or production." That is, it is an assignment of a part of
the lessee's seven-eighths interest under the conventional oil and gas lease
and neither impairs nor diminishes the landowner's one-eighth royalty. It
may be created by an outright grant by the lessee or by a reservation in the
assignment of the operating rights of the lessee."
Overriding royalties are to be distinguished from the royalty payable
to the lessor under the conventional oil and gas lease." They are also to
"Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95 (1943).
'Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 499, 76 P.2d 779 (1938) ; and see Merrill, The Partia4
Assigne--Done in Oil, 20 TIExAs L. REv. 298 (1942).
'Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)--oil payment
out of fractional share of production; Fairburn v. Eaton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 264, 43
P.2d 113 (1935)--overriding royalty.
'"An overriding royalty is a certain percentage of the working interest which as be-
tween the lessee and the assignee is not charged with the cost of development or
production. The oil payment is similar to the overriding royalty, except that the
interest of the assignee ceases upon his receiving a certain amount of money or
value out of oil or gas produced from a certain percentage of the working interest.
The interest commonly spoken of as an 'undivided interest' Is an undivided per-
centage of the working interest, which differs from the oil payment or the over-
riding royalty in that it is chargeable with its pro tanto share of the cost of de-
velopment and production." Knight v. Chicago Corporation, 183 S.W.2d 666, 670
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
"In a farm-out the lessee of a large tract transfers or agrees to transfer to a third
person the leasehold estate as to a designated area in return for the agreement of
the third party to drill a well thereon. See Rex Oil and Gas Co. v. Busk, 335 Mich.
368, 56 N.W.2d 221 (1953).
'Phillps Pet. Co. v. Oldland, 187 F.2d 780 (C.C.A. Colo. 1951) ; Wright v. Brush,
155 F.2d 265 (C.C.A. Kan. 1940) ; Thornburgh v. Cole, 201 Okla. 609, 207 P.2d 1096
(1949) ; Knight v. Chicago Corp., note 69, supra.
"Zephyr Oil Co. v. Cunningham, 265 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)-reservation
is In fact an exception because it withholds from the operation of the'assignment
something existant in the assignor which otherwise would pass to the assignee. For
an example of the methods of creating overriding royalties, see Robinson v. Jones,
119 Kan. 609, 240 Pac. 957 (1925) ; and see Hershberger, Landowner's Royalties and
Overriding Royalties, 9 KANSAS B.A.J. 29 (1940) ; Comment, Overriding Royalties,
Proceeds Intere8ts, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 480 (1938).
""The term 'overriding royalty' is applied generally in the industry to such frac-
tional interests in the production of oil and gas as are created from the lessee's
estate ... the term 'royalty' is generally applied to the fractional interests in the
production which are created by the owner of the land either by a reservation
when an oil and gas lease is entered into or by direct grant to a third person."
La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351, 353, 135 A.L.R. 546
(1941).
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be distinguished from assignments by the lessor of a part of the royalty
payable to him under existing or future leases."
Although the term "overriding royalty" is not conclusive of the nature
of the interest created," it does have a usage in the indsutry as denoting a
share in the gross production which is carved out of the lessee's interest."
An agreement to pay an overriding royalty is a covenant that runs with
the lease and not with the land. Therefore, absent fraud or bad faith, a
termination of the lease will extinguish the overriding royalty" An express
provision in the assignment that the override will continue in the event the
lease is extended or renewed will preclude termination of the overriding
royalty."' In the absence of such a provision, the override will continue in
force if there is bad faith on the part of the lesseeM or if the lessee has
failed to discharge a duty owing to the owner of the overriding royalty in-
terest. ®
Oil Payments
Oil payments are similar to overriding royalties, i.e., they are assign-
ments or reservations of a fractional part of the working interest which are
not charged with the cost of production. They differ in respect to duration:
the override continues throughout the life of the lease; the oil payment
terminates upon payment of a certain amount of money or value out of oil
and gas produced from a stipulated percentage of the working interest.' It
has been classified as an interest in personal property,' as creating a debtor-
71"Where after entering into such an oil and gas lease, the lessor assigns to third
person fractional interests in the royalties which he has reserved to himself, the
holder of such a fractional interest acquires an interest in real property, an in-
corporeal hereditament analogous to the right to receive future rents of real prop-
erty.- La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, note 73, supra.
75Dashko v. Friedman, 59 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)-term denotes freedom
from costs of production and not an interest in land.
"Cities Service Oil Co. v. Geolograph Co., Inc., 208 Okla. 179, 254 P.2d 775 (1953)-
use of term "overriding royalty" construed according to operative usage of indus-
try.
"La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, note 73, supra--quit claim deed by lessee to lessor
to avoid forfeiture for failure to drill; Smith v. Drake, 134 Cal. App. 700, 26 P.2d
313 (1933)-surrender; Ascher v. Midstates Oil Corp., 222 La. 812, 64 So. 2d 182
(1953)--override is appendage of the lease, and if lease is still In effect the over-
ride is not separately prescriptible; Dos Puebles R. & 1. Co. v. Ellis, 44 Cal. App. 2d
299, 112 P.2d 302 (1941)--cancellation of lease by lessor; and see Collins v. Atlantic
Oil Prod. Co., 74 F.2d 122 (C.C.A. Tex. 1934) ; Henderson Co. v. Murphy, 189 Ark.
87, 70 S.W.2d 1036 (1934).
"Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okla: 11, 286 Pac. 875, 69 A.L.R. 929 (1930) ; and see Robin-
son v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 132 Kan. 860, 297 Pac. 697, 75 A.L.R. 840 (1931). Con-
tra: Berman v. Brown, 224 La. 619, 70 So. 2d 433 (1954)-not binding upon successor
to assignee; noted 28 TULANF, L. RE'. 408.
"Smith v. Drake, note 77, 8upra-collusion between lessor and lessee indicated as a
possible basis for imposition of trust for benefit of owner of override on subse-
quently executed lease.
Hivick v. Urschel, 171 Okla. 17, 40 P.2d 1077 (1935)--constructive trust where as-
signee failed to give assignor option to repurchase lease as per terms of assignment.
"'Knight v. Chicago Corporation, 183 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). For a dis-
cussion of the principles considered In this section, see Walker, Oil Payments, 20
TsixAs L. REv. 259 (1942) ; Brown, Assignments o1 Interests in Oil and Gas Leases:
Farm Out Agreements, Bottom Hole Letters, Reservation of Overrides and Oil Pay-
lnelft8, FIFTH ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON OIL AND GAs LAW ANV TAXATION 25 (1954).
t McCrae v. Bradley Oil Co., 148 Kan. 911, 84 P.2d 866 (1938)-oral agreement all
right, not within the statute of frauds.
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creditor relationship," as constituting an equitable lien,' and as an interest
in land whether payable in kind or in money.' As an interest in land, it
has been characterized as bonus and not royalty" and as subject to the pay-
ment of gross production taxes unless the parties agree otherwise.'
An agreement to make oil payments is not merely personal but is a
covenant that runs with the land. ' However, there is no personal liability
in the sense of an absolute promise to pay. The obligation arises only when
production is obtained.' The burden of the covenant runs with the land
and binds an assignee of the party agreeing to make the oil payment.' The
benefit of the covenant likewise runs and inures to a purchaser of such an
interest." An oil payment is an encumbrance within the purview of a gen-
eral covenant of warranty and constitutes a breach thereof."
T)he doctrine of implied covenants is applicable to oil payments as well
as to overriding royalties.' In respect to termination, the principles applica-
ble to overrides likewise controls, i.e., the interest is one which runs with
the lease and not with the land and it will terminate unless active fraud or
some fiduciary obligation can be established." Termination of the lease in
accordance with the terms thereof, in the absence of bad faith, will terminate
the oil payment."
t Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175 (1937).
"Davis v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 91, 100 P.2d 994 (1940).
Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, 110 S.W.2d 53 (1937)-payable in oil; Sheppard v.
Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)-payable in
money; and see Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal. 2d 580, 140 P.2d 392,
149 A.L.R. 320 (1943).
'State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757
(1940).
'Cities Service Oil Co. v. McCrory, 191 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; Texas Co.
v. Fontenot, 200 La. 753, 8 So. 2d 689 (1942).
'Western Oil and Ref. Co. v. Venago Oil Corporation, 218 Cal. 733, 24 P.2d 971
(1933).
'Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., note 85, 8upra; Texas Co. v. Mattocks, 211
Ark 972, 204 S.W.2d 176 (1947). Contra: Nigh v. Haas, 139 Kan. 307, 31 P.2d 28
(1934)-covenant does not run with the land and bind parties dealing with an as-
signee.
"Texas Co. v. Mattocks, note 89, supra.
"Goetter v. Manahan, 192 Okla. 600, 138 P.2d 113 (1943) ; Local Federal Savings
and Loan Assn. v. Eckroat, 186 Okla. 660, 100 P.2d 261 (1940). For a consideration
of the proposition that benefits and burdens of a covenant may run independently,
see CLA.x, RE-AL COVENANTS AND OTHER INERESTS WHICH RUN WITH LAND, 101
(28 ed., 1947).
"Compton v. Trico Oil Co., 120 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
'Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. v. Kimmel, 68 P.2d 520 (C.C.A. Okla. 1934)-implied
covenant to develop; Phillips Pet. Co. v. Taylor, 116 F.2d 994 (C.C.A. Tex. 1941)
cert. den, 313 U.S. 565-implied covenant to prevent drainage; Cole Petroleum Co.
v. United States Gas and Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414, 86 A.L.R. 719 (1931)
-implied covenant to market production; Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 2 S.W.2d
421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)-assignee of lessee not obligated to drill but could either
drill or pay delay rentals as per terms of original lease; Tunstill v. Gulf Production
Co., 79 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)-assignee of lessee entitled to abandon
the lease where production not sufficient to make operation profitable, even though
oil payment not satisfied. And see Merrill, Implied Covenant8 Between Others
Than Lessors and Lessees, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 155 (1942).
"Smith v. Drake, note 77, supra; Hivick v. Urschel, note 80, supra; MacDonald v.
Follett, 193 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)-partnership or joint venture.
"Gordon v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 63 F.2d 487 (C.C.A. Tex. 1933) ; and see case
cited in note 77, supra.
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D. OBLIGATIONS ON COVENANTS
The Distinction between Assignments and Subleases
Every transfer of an interest in the lease by an oil and gas lessee is not
an assignment. Thus:
The distinction between an assignment of a lease and a sublease
is that, in an assignment, the assignor transfers his entire interest
in the lease insofar as it affects the property on which the lease is
assigned; whereas, in a sublease, the original lessee, or sublessor,
retains an interest in the lease insofar as it affects the property
subleased-by imposing some obligation upon the sublessee in favor
of the sublessor. ...'
The term "lease" as applied to oil and gas operating rights is a mis-
nomer. However, it is the usage of the industry, and in a few jurisdictions
the distinction between an assignment and a sublease has been made in de-
fining the rights and obligations of an assignee of the lessee. Thus, the
reservation of an overriding royalty,' of a right of re-entry," and the trans-
fer for less than the entire portion of the remaining term,' have resulted in
subleases rather than assignments. In such a case there is neither privity
of contract nor privity of estate between the original lessor and the trans-
feree of the lessee. Consequently, an attempted release by such a transferee
to the original lessor is invalid,' and the transferee is not bound by the co-
venants in the original lease' unless he expressly assumes them.' Where
the distinction is recognized, it would also be material in the interpretation
of a lease provision relieving a lessee of all obligations upon assignment.
Effect of Assignment upon the Obligations of the Lessee-In General
After assignment the lessee remains liable upon all express covenants
in the lease because the privity of contract with the original lessor continues
to subsist.' The assignee is bound because of privity of estate; the lessee
remains bound because of privity of contract. An express release by the
lessor, or one which may be inferred from the circumstances, is necessary be-
fore this liability of the lessee terminates. Contemporary lease forms con-
tain a provision in the assignments clause that the lessee will be relieved of
the obligations of the lease after assignment.
"Roberson v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46, 48, 82 A.L.R. 1264(1931). For a consideration of the problems in Louisiana, see Moses, The Distinc-
tion Between a Sublease and an Assignment of a Mineral Interest in Louisiana, 18
TmxAs L. REv. 159 (1940), 13 TULANE L. hEv. 231 (1948) ; and see Garner v. Knud-
sen,-Cal. App. 2d.-, 277 P.2d 890 (1954).
'Sunburst Oil and Ref. Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 Pac. 834 (1929).
"Saling v. Flesch, 85 Mont. 106, 277 Pac. 612 (1929).
"Jackson v. Sims, 201 F.2d 259 (C.C.A. Okla. 19M3).
0 Saling v. Flesch, note 98, supra.
m McNamer Realty Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Gas Co., 76 Mont. 332, 247 Pac. 166 (1926).
'Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937)-
lessor protected on theory of third party beneficiary.
'Benson v. Nyman, 136 Kan. 445, 16 P.2d 963, 964 (1932)-"It is agreed that it is
one of the conditions of the lease, and of the acceptance thereby by the said second
party that he and his successors or assigns, shall have the right at any time on
payment of One Dollar ($1.00) . . .to surrender this lease for cancellation after
which all payments and liabilities thereafter to accrue under and by virtue of its
terms shall cease and determine."
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Liability of the Lessee after Assignment
However, in addition to the express covenants of the lease, there are
certain implied covenants that impose additional obligations upon the lessee.
The continuing obligation of the lessee after assignment depends upon
whether these covenants are implied in fact or in law. If implied in fact,
they conform to the unexpressed intent of the parties and therefore are con-
tractual in nature, and the obligations of the lessee continue." If implied
in law, they stem from the mutual relationship of the parties and therefore
privity of estate is a prerequisite, and the obligations of the lessee terminate
upon assignment.'
Liability of the Assignee upon Covenants in the Lease
The liability of an assignee of the lessee is predicated upon privity of
estate unless he expressly assumes the obligations of the lease in the instru-
ment of assignment." Therefore, his liability is limited to those breaches
which occur during his ownership of an interest in the leasehold estate, i.e.,
he is not liable for breaches that occurred before he acquired his interest or
after he has disposed of it.' The burden of both express and implied co-
venants runs with the land and binds an assignee so long as privity of estate
continues.'
The doctrine of equitable servitudes-that a person who acquires an
interest in land with notice of a restriction thereon which touches and con-
cerns the land and which the parties intended to be binding upon subsequent
owners will be bound by the restriction even though there is no privity of
estate with the person for whose benefit the restriction was imposed-is
likewise applicable to oil and gas assignees. '
The assignee is entitled to the benefits of those covenants that run with
the leasehold estate so long as the relationship of privity of estate con-
tinues.' °
"Gillet v. Elmhurst Investment Co., 111 Kan. 755, 207 Pac. 843 (1922) ; and see Bod-
caw Oil Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 217 Ark. 50, 228 S.W.2d 626 (1950) ; Indian Ter-
ritory Ill. Oil Co. v. Rosemond, 190 Okla. 46, 120 P.2d 349, 138 A.L.R. 246 (1941) ;
Danciger Oil and Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632, 137 A.L.R. 408
(1941) ; Adkins v. Adams, 152 F.2d 489 (C.C.A. Ill. 1945).
'OoFo a criticism of the view that they are implied in fact, see MERRILL, COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES, § 220 (1940).
'Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., note 102, supra.
1 7Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (1933) ; Ardizzone v.
Archer, 71 Okla. 289, 160 Pac. 446 (1916) ; that the benefit of express covenants in
the lease run in favor of an assignee of the lessor, see Cummings v. United Fuel Co.,
116 W. Va. 599, 182 S.E. 789, 102 A.L.R. 264 (1935)-benefit of express covenant
to protect against drainage and develop premises runs to wards on whose behalf
an oil and gas lease was executed by guardians.
O'Gillett v. Elmhurst iv. Co., 111 Kan. 755, 207 Pac. 943 (1922).
'wSouthwest Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F.2d 248, 64 A.L.R. 1229
(C.C.A. Okla. 1929)-assignee of lease who took with notice of gas purchase con-
tract executed by lessee with gas transmission company; British-American Oil Prod.
Co. v. Buffington, 116 F.2d 363 (C.C.A. Tex. 1940) cert. denied 312 U.S. 7089---as-
signee of lease who took with notice of preferential drilling contract executed by
lessee with drilling contractor.
"
0 Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938)-implied warranty against
eviction; Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Jordan, 151 Okla. 147, 3 P.2d 170, 79 A.L.R.
492 (1931)-covenant of general warranty does not run with land but may be as-
signed pursuant to express provision in lease permitting assignment of lease and
all covenants therein.
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Effect of Performance by a Partial Assignee
There is a sharp conflict in authority as to whether the express and
implied obligations of an oil and gas lessee are divisible, i.e., whether the
benefit of performance or the burden of failure to perform will inure to
partial assignees or assignors who have retained a partial interest.' Thus,
the lease is considered an entirety in so far as the duty to pay delay rentals
is concerned, and a partial assignee may not tender a fraction of the delay
rental and preserve his interest in the absence of an express provision in the
lease."
As to development and production, the lease is regarded as indivisible
so that drilling or securing production on any part of the severally assigned
tract will inure to the benefit of all segregated parts of the original lease'
Thus, it has been observed:
Of oil and gas leases generally it may be said that ordinarily
they are regarded as indivisible as to the express conditions which
fix the vesting of the determinable fee, such as the drilling of a
certain number of wells, when that is required, or the obtaining of
production in the absence of a specific requirement, and that as-
signees under an original lease hold their titles to their several
tracts without the necessity of further rental payments, or of fur-
ther compliance with these express drilling conditions when they
have been complied with on any part of the lease."'
On principle it would appear that the partial assignee is subject to the
implied duty to market the production obtained and to protect that part of
the lease which he owns from drainage caused by wells outside the limits of
the tract as originally leased.'
Farm-Out Agreements
A farm-out agreement is a contract between an oil and gas lessee and
a third person to assign, or an outright assignment of, the lease-hold inter-
est in a described tract, conditional, however, upon the drilling of a test
well and the performance of specified obligations incident thereto. The
purpose of such an agreement is to secure the drilling of a well prior to the
expiration of the primary term of the lease. The agreemnt has many varia-
tions. The lessee may make an outright assignment of his entire interest
in a part of the land under lease together with dry hole contribution money
with the assignee assuming an obligation to drill to a specified depth.'
Where the lessee owns widely scattered and comparatively small blocks of
mSee Merrill, The Partial As8ignee -Done in Oil, 20 TExAs L. REv. 298 (1942).
'Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (C.C.A. Tex. 1932).
mMeacham v. Halley, 103 F.2d 967 (C.C.A. Tex. 1939) ; Pearson v. Black 120 S.W.2d
1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938--drilling operations by one partial assignee abates the
rentals as to the entire tract. And see Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 449, 76 P.2d
779 (1938) ; Texas Co. v. Waggoner, 239 S.W. S54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; Cowman
v. Phillips Pet. Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P.2d 988 (1935)-production by assignor con-
tinued lease as to partial assignee; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 Pac.
540. 11 A.L.R. 129 (1920)-production by partial assignee continues portion of
leased premises retained by assignor; Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.
Com. App. 1941).
"Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634, 637 (C.C.A. Tex. 1932).
mSee Merrill, The Partial Assignee-Done in Oil, 20 TExAs L. REv. 298, 311 (1942)
'For a discussion of this approach in the Williston Basin, see Ralph, Ba4Rn at Awk-
ward Age, 52 OIL AND GAS J., 74 (Sept. 14, 1953).
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acreage, the assignment may be of the entire interest with a reservation of
an overriding royalty or a carried interest.
The farm-out agreement may be an informal letter of the lessee en-
dorsed by the intended assignee, or it may be a formally executed contract.n'
Contributing to the Cost of Drilling a Well
A reduction in the cost of drilling a well may be obtained by securing
agreements to contribute to the cost in return for the information secured
thereby or by securing agreements to purchase a portion of the acreage
under lease as soon as the well reaches a specified depth. In the former
case, the party agreeing to make contribution may own leases in the viciinty
and is willing to pay for a test of a specified formation that also underles his
land. He may be willing to pay whether the well produces or not; in which
event, a "bottom hole letter' is executed. He may feel that obtaining
production is a sufficient reward for drilling the well and so agrees to con-
tribute only if the well is nonproductive; in which event, a "dry hole letter"
is executed.
Securities Regulation of Assignments
The issuance and transfer of securities are regulated to prevent the
frauds previously perpetrated upon the investment public."' In the states it
is accomplished through the so-called "blue-sky" laws,'m whereas on the
federal level and with respect to interstate transactions it is accomplished
through the Securities Act.' The federal approach is predicated upon a
full disclosure of all pertinent facts through the filing of a registration
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the tender of
a prospectus containing similar information to prospective purchasers.' In
nuFor an illustration of an informal letter-type greement, see Brown, Assignments of
Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements, Bottom Hole Letters, Reser-
vations of Overrides and Oil Payments, FTrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OiL AND GAS
LAW AND TA XATION 25, 70 (1954) ; and see Rex Oil and Gas Co. v. Busk, 335 Mich.
368, 56 N.W.2d 221 (1953).
'u8A bottom hole letter includes much the same language as a dry hole letter with
the exception of the terms upon which payment Is to be made. There is also a
specific provision defining the drilling obligation where an impenetrable substance
is encountered above the specified depth. See Anderson v. Bell, 70 Wyo. 471, 251
P.2d 572 (1952). For a short form of bottom hole letter, see Brown, Assignments
of Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements, Bottom Hole Letters,
Reservations of Overrides and Oil Payments, Firrm ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 25, 82 (1954).
n"The object of the law is to protect the public from the dishonesty, Incompetence,
ignorance and Irresponsibility of persons engaged in the business of disposing of
scuritles of uncertain value whereby the Inexperienced and confiding are likely to
suffer loss." Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N.E. 310, 317 (1921).
"*Illustrative of the blue sky laws applicable in. the oil-producing states are the fol-
lowing: Arkansas, ArKx. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1201-1234 (1947) ; California, CAL. CORP.
CODE: ANN., Tit. 4. Div. 1 (Deering, 1948) ; Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT., § 17-1223
et seq. (Corrick, 1949) ; Montana, Rsv. Con OF MONT., § 66-2001 et seq. (Replace-
ment 1953) ; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 77-1 et seq. (1951) ; Texas, Tsx. Rsv.
CIv. STAT., Art. 600a (Vernon, 1948).
''48 Stat. 74 (1933) ; 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1951).
"'The main requirement of the act Is that the Issuer of securities sold or delivered
through interstate commerce or the malls must, prior thereto, file a registration
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission, stating information deemed
appropriate by Congress. The Commission must register any Issue regardless of
the security, where the registration statement Is not on Its face incomplete or In-
accurate. The speculative nature of the enterprise is no ground for refusing the
use of the malls or the channels of commerce for its sale." Crosby v. Well, 382 I1.
538, 48 N.E.2d 386, 388 (1943).
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the states the methods of regulation vary; the most prevalent is a licensing
of dealers and an investigation of the proposed issue by the Securities Com-
missioner.' The assignments of interests in oil and gas are the proper objects
of such regulation by virtue of their inclusion in the definition of "secur-
ity"."' The fact that they are also interests in land and that their sale in-
volves a transfer of real property, is immaterial.' Failure to comply with
these regulatory provisions subjects the issuer to civil liability and entitles
the purchaser to rescind within a stipulated period even though the transac-
tion is a fair one.'
The original lease is not a fractional undivided interest and therefore
is not within the definition of a security under the federal act.' However,
the subdivision of the original lease and the sale of fractional parts thereof
constitutes an investment contract under the act and is subject to regula-
tion.' The act applies to issuers of fractional undivided interests, i.e., to
an owner of such an interest who in turn creates fractional interests therein
for the purpose of offering them to the public for sale.'
There are three instances in which the registration provisions of the
Securities Act do not apply: intrastate offerings, private offerings, and
offerings less than $300,000.
Where intrastate offerings are involved, the issuer and purchaser must
be residents of the same state and the assignment must not be for purposes
of resale to persons outside the state.'
The distinction between public offerings and private offerings within
terms of the exemption of the latter under the Act"' is difficult to make. It
has been held that:
.. Congress did not intend the term "public offering" t mean an
offering to any and all members of the public who cared to avail
'BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 367, 368 (1946) ; and see the statement of purpose in
the state blue sky laws.
''The Texas Securities Act includes in the definition of security "... certificate or
any instrument representing any interest in or under an oil, gas or mining lease,
fee or title . . ." TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN., Art. 600a, § 2(a) (Vernon, 1948).
An oil and gas lease has been held to be a security within the terms of this
definition, Herren v. Hollingsworth, 140 Tex. 263, 167 S.W.2d 735 (1943).
The Securities Act includes in the definition of security ". . . fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1951). Under some circumstances an oil and gas lease falls within this definition,
S.E.C. v.C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 64 Sup. Ct. 120, 88 L.E. 88 (1943).
' Herren v Hollingsworth, note 124, supra-lease; Morello v. Metzenbaum, 25 Cal.
2d 494, 154 P.2d 670 (1944)-fractional part of landowners royalty; Cosner v. Han-
cock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)-oil payment.
-15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1951) : TEx. RE v. Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 600f. § 33a (Vernon,
1948).
I'Note 124, supra.
tS.E.C. v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., note 124, supra. An investment contract for
purposes of the Securities Act has been defined as ". . . a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money In a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the effort8 of the promoter or a third party, It being Im-
material whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates
or by nominal Interests in the physical assets employed In the enterprise." S.E.C.
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 US. 293, 66 Sup. Ct. 1100. 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946)-emphasis
supplied. Leases may constitute securities within the meaning of this definition
If the promoter promises to drill a well in the vicinity which, if successful, will in-
crease the value of the leasehold estate.
'OFor a discussion of who is an issuer in such a case, see Federal Trade Commission,
Security Act Release 185 (1934) ; that underwriters and dealers are also Included,
see 17 Code of Federal Rerulations § 230.300 (1949).
'n1 5 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (l) (1951).15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) (1V51).
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themselves of the offer .... An offering to stockholders, other than
a very small number, was a public offering.'
The general exemption under Regulation A' is not applicable to fractional
undivided interests in oil and gas.
There is a special regulation, referred to as Regulation B,' T which pro-
vides for a short form of registration where the issue is not in excess of
$300,000.' This provision is available only to registered dealers,' where
the working interest retained by the operating lessee equals 20 per cent or
the issuance is less than $3 0 ,0 0 0 ,' and when a specified form of offering
sheet is filed with the Commission before any offer to sell is made.'
The broad definition of security in the state Securities Laws' includes
all oil and gas assignments, whether fractional or entire. ' However, there
are numerous specific exemptions.'' Thus, if the owner of such interests
does not engage in the sale of securities as a business, he may effect such
transactions in his own behalf without complying with the provisions of the
Act.' Failure to comply with the requirements of the state Securities Laws
subjects the issuer to both civil and criminal liability and entitles the pur-
chaser to rescind.'" Similar penalties are provided for under the federal
laws.'" However, the civil liability is subject to a one year statute of
limitations.'" Individuals engaged in the business of buying and selling frac-
tional undivided interests in oil and gas or entire interests that may be classi-
fied as investment contracts are also subject to regulation. That is, in addi-
tion to complying with the registration provisions applicable to securities,
they must also register personally as dealers, if engaged in business on their
own account, or as brokers, if acting for others on an agency basis."
CONCLUSION
Assignments of oil and gas interests must be prepared with extreme
care and great attention to detail. Attention has been devoted herein only
S.E.C. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 702 (C.C.A. Wash. 1938).
1317 Code of Federal Regulations, § 230.220 (1949). However, the offerer can
avail himself of the registration procedures under Regulation A by organizing a
corporation, transferring the oil and gas interests to the corporation, and making
public offering of the corporate stock.
"17 Code of Federal Regulations, §§ 230.300456 (1949).
"-Ibid., § 230.310.
3'15 U.S.C. § 78 (o) (1951).
"w17 Code of Federal Regulations, § 230.314 (1954 Supp.)
'17 Code of Federal Regulation, §§ 230.320, 230.330 (1949).
O'See note 124 supra, for the Texas definition.
1'"See cases cited in notes 124 and 125, supra.
"'ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1204(g) (1947) ; CoLo. STAT. ANN. C. 148, § 13 (1) (1935);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 71-21 (i) (1951) ; REV. CODE OF MONT. § 66-2003 (9) (Replace-
ment 1953) ; TiEx. REV. Civ. STAT., Art. 600a, § 3 (Vernon, 1948).
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 600a § 3 (Vernon, 1948) ; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 148, § 13 (1)
(1935) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 71-72 (i) (1951).
1'Note 126, supra. For a general discussion of the problems involved, see Commeut,
The Texas Securities Act as It Applies to Interests in Oil and Gas, 22 TEXAS L. RE€7.
346 (1944) ; Meer, Oil Finance anA the Securities Laws, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 885
(1951) Comment, Oil and Gas Interests as Securities, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 359
(1938); Bloomenthal, SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 Wyo. L.J. 49
(1953).
'"15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77m, 77x (1951).
"'15 U.S.C. § 77m (1951).
1"48 Stat. 881 (1934) ; 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1951)-other than those whose business is
exclusively intrastate.
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to the substantive considerations involved. In many instances, however, the
form which a particular transfer will take is dictated by certain peripheral
considerations such as the minimization of tax consequences or the avoid-
ance of regulation under the various Securities Laws. The technicality of
such transfers and the ambiguity that may result where general language
is used must be foremost in the mind of the draftsman in order that the
dual objectives of effecting a transfer of the intended interest and at the
same time reaping the tax advantages of careful planning maybe realized.
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